Explainer 5: Can we trust Iran to submit to the inspections regime and to not pursue a nuclear weapon in the future?
We don't have to have faith in them. Iran has permitted the US and the world to see for themselves. If Iran engages in nuclear activities that are military in nature, we will know.
How do we know that we'll know?
The agreement implements monitoring of the entire nuclear fuel cycle. From the moment uranium ore is extracted from the earth, to the time it is processed into usable metal, to the time that it is converted into uranium hexafluoride gas to be spun in thousands of sophisticated centrifuges to isolate and concentrate the U-235 isotope, to the point where it is cast into pieces of nuclear fuel, to the moment it is disposed of (and not converted into fissile plutonium), it is being constantly counted, watched, and monitored. If the monitoring shows that the amount of nuclear fuel produced at declared Iranian nuclear sites does not correspond with the amounts one would expect from a given amount of extracted uranium, inspectors will know that the Iranians are up to funny business.
What about UNdeclared nuclear sites, like the facilities at Qom and Parchin, or even ones we don't know about?
Nuclear enrichment and nuclear weapons manufacturing are not at all easy to conceal. To do nuclear enrichment, one must have a MASSIVE supply of electric power to run the centrifuges, large amounts of totally sterile and spotless space in which to run thousands of centrifuges, and rather conspicuous supply and logistics lines. All of these things can be reliably monitored by American and other Western geospatial and signals intelligence capacity.
What about the whole 24-days thing? 24 days!
Critics of the deal are saying that we will have to give the Iranians 24 days' notice before conducting any inspections. This is simply untrue.
The IAEA, and the American and Western representatives who will help carry out its mandate, have constant monitoring of Iran's declared nuclear sites. That includes 24/7 video monitoring, frequent inspections, and strict oversight of the whole nuclear fuel cycle.
If the US or its partners were to find a site they want inspected that is NOT on the list of declared Iranian nuclear sites, the process by which the IAEA, the concerned international party, and Iran negotiate and coordinate the inspection of that site may take no longer than 24 days.
Can't Iran just cover it up with that much warning?
If it is nearly impossible to get all of the nuclear equipment and infrastructure away from a site within 24 days, it is physically impossible to scrub the site clean of radiation and other evidence of nuclear activity in anywhere near that time frame. If there is evidence of undeclared, unauthorized nuclear activity at a site, it will be found.
Most of all, if and when the IAEA, the US, or its partners discover that Iran is up to some funny business, we will be in a very strong position to investigate it and extract answers. If we find that Iran is in violation of the nonproliferation deal, we will be in far, far stronger position to inflict intolerable punishment upon them for it than we would if the deal was not in place. Moreover, permitting Iran, Iranian businesses, and Iranian people to form relationships with Western business, social, and political entities will make it all the more painful for Iran to forsake those fresh ties if they decide to engage in military nuclear activity. As the flight of Western corporations and capital from Russia in the wake of the Ukraine crises have shown, Western firms are not very inclined to invest billions of dollars in countries against whom the US is engaged in geopolitical combat.
How do we know that we'll know?
The agreement implements monitoring of the entire nuclear fuel cycle. From the moment uranium ore is extracted from the earth, to the time it is processed into usable metal, to the time that it is converted into uranium hexafluoride gas to be spun in thousands of sophisticated centrifuges to isolate and concentrate the U-235 isotope, to the point where it is cast into pieces of nuclear fuel, to the moment it is disposed of (and not converted into fissile plutonium), it is being constantly counted, watched, and monitored. If the monitoring shows that the amount of nuclear fuel produced at declared Iranian nuclear sites does not correspond with the amounts one would expect from a given amount of extracted uranium, inspectors will know that the Iranians are up to funny business.
What about UNdeclared nuclear sites, like the facilities at Qom and Parchin, or even ones we don't know about?
Nuclear enrichment and nuclear weapons manufacturing are not at all easy to conceal. To do nuclear enrichment, one must have a MASSIVE supply of electric power to run the centrifuges, large amounts of totally sterile and spotless space in which to run thousands of centrifuges, and rather conspicuous supply and logistics lines. All of these things can be reliably monitored by American and other Western geospatial and signals intelligence capacity.
What about the whole 24-days thing? 24 days!
Critics of the deal are saying that we will have to give the Iranians 24 days' notice before conducting any inspections. This is simply untrue.
The IAEA, and the American and Western representatives who will help carry out its mandate, have constant monitoring of Iran's declared nuclear sites. That includes 24/7 video monitoring, frequent inspections, and strict oversight of the whole nuclear fuel cycle.
If the US or its partners were to find a site they want inspected that is NOT on the list of declared Iranian nuclear sites, the process by which the IAEA, the concerned international party, and Iran negotiate and coordinate the inspection of that site may take no longer than 24 days.
Can't Iran just cover it up with that much warning?
If it is nearly impossible to get all of the nuclear equipment and infrastructure away from a site within 24 days, it is physically impossible to scrub the site clean of radiation and other evidence of nuclear activity in anywhere near that time frame. If there is evidence of undeclared, unauthorized nuclear activity at a site, it will be found.
Most of all, if and when the IAEA, the US, or its partners discover that Iran is up to some funny business, we will be in a very strong position to investigate it and extract answers. If we find that Iran is in violation of the nonproliferation deal, we will be in far, far stronger position to inflict intolerable punishment upon them for it than we would if the deal was not in place. Moreover, permitting Iran, Iranian businesses, and Iranian people to form relationships with Western business, social, and political entities will make it all the more painful for Iran to forsake those fresh ties if they decide to engage in military nuclear activity. As the flight of Western corporations and capital from Russia in the wake of the Ukraine crises have shown, Western firms are not very inclined to invest billions of dollars in countries against whom the US is engaged in geopolitical combat.
I posted about this the other night, but Iranians are dancing in the streets over this deal. They welcome it. They want it to work. They want their proud nation to re-gain its ties with other respectable countries. They want to be able to buy Western goods and watch Western shows and listen to Western music. I really feel like Iranians, especially young Iranians, feel like they have a stake in this deal working. This means something to the Grand Ayatollah, and it means something to their democratically-elected leader, Hassan Rouhani. Iran is hurting, and it doesn't want to hurt anymore.
Explainer 6: What's the worst that can happen if we reject the deal?
There's a lot of speculation on this question, but I'm going to stick the implications for American diplomacy and the conditions we would be imposing on the geopolitical game theory calculus and chess game.
If we reject this deal, we have rejected THE diplomatic option for ensuring that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon. The only option left on the table is the military one. If we do not accept this deal, it will mean that at the end of the day, our only avenue to reliably prevent Iranian nuclear weapons acquisition is to physically stop them from developing and constructing the bomb. That would, realistically, mean destroying and rebuilding the Islamic Republic of Iran. As some of you might remember, it did not go so well the last time we tried to do something like this.
Almost as important to note is that if we reject this deal, we have told the whole world that our pretenses for making them forego lucrative and geopolitically-advantageous business with Iran--to force Iran to agree to a highly-restrictive nuclear deal--were blatantly false. We told the whole world that Iran needed to be isolated and shunned and punished because it was a threat to world security, but we showed that our real reason was that we just did not like them. What's more, we broadcast to the world that when the US comes to the negotiating table, it's our way or the highway. We don't make concessions. We don't compromise. We don't sacrifice. In other words, using diplomacy as a way to resolve disputes with the United States is useless.
You know what that means?
It means that a lot more of our demands are going to either be empty threats (meaning we cannot get what we want or need) or commitments to war--to massive expenditures of treasure, to substantial diplomatic and geopolitical pain, and to the loss of life, limb, and spirit for thousands of American men and women under arms.
Explainer 6: What's the worst that can happen if we reject the deal?
There's a lot of speculation on this question, but I'm going to stick the implications for American diplomacy and the conditions we would be imposing on the geopolitical game theory calculus and chess game.
If we reject this deal, we have rejected THE diplomatic option for ensuring that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon. The only option left on the table is the military one. If we do not accept this deal, it will mean that at the end of the day, our only avenue to reliably prevent Iranian nuclear weapons acquisition is to physically stop them from developing and constructing the bomb. That would, realistically, mean destroying and rebuilding the Islamic Republic of Iran. As some of you might remember, it did not go so well the last time we tried to do something like this.
Almost as important to note is that if we reject this deal, we have told the whole world that our pretenses for making them forego lucrative and geopolitically-advantageous business with Iran--to force Iran to agree to a highly-restrictive nuclear deal--were blatantly false. We told the whole world that Iran needed to be isolated and shunned and punished because it was a threat to world security, but we showed that our real reason was that we just did not like them. What's more, we broadcast to the world that when the US comes to the negotiating table, it's our way or the highway. We don't make concessions. We don't compromise. We don't sacrifice. In other words, using diplomacy as a way to resolve disputes with the United States is useless.
You know what that means?
It means that a lot more of our demands are going to either be empty threats (meaning we cannot get what we want or need) or commitments to war--to massive expenditures of treasure, to substantial diplomatic and geopolitical pain, and to the loss of life, limb, and spirit for thousands of American men and women under arms.
No comments:
Post a Comment