Explainer 5 on the Iranian nuclear deal

Explainer 5: Can we trust Iran to submit to the inspections regime and to not pursue a nuclear weapon in the future?

We don't have to have faith in them. Iran has permitted the US and the world to see for themselves. If Iran engages in nuclear activities that are military in nature, we will know.

How do we know that we'll know?

The agreement implements monitoring of the entire nuclear fuel cycle.  From the moment uranium ore is extracted from the earth, to the time it is processed into usable metal, to the time that it is converted into uranium hexafluoride gas to be spun in thousands of sophisticated centrifuges to isolate and concentrate the U-235 isotope, to the point where it is cast into pieces of nuclear fuel, to the moment it is disposed of (and not converted into fissile plutonium), it is being constantly counted, watched, and monitored.  If the monitoring shows that the amount of nuclear fuel produced at declared Iranian nuclear sites does not correspond with the amounts one would expect from a given amount of extracted uranium, inspectors will know that the Iranians are up to funny business.

What about UNdeclared nuclear sites, like the facilities at Qom and Parchin, or even ones we don't know about?

Nuclear enrichment and nuclear weapons manufacturing are not at all easy to conceal.  To do nuclear enrichment, one must have a MASSIVE supply of electric power to run the centrifuges, large amounts of totally sterile and spotless space in which to run thousands of centrifuges, and rather conspicuous supply and logistics lines.  All of these things can be reliably monitored by American and other Western geospatial and signals intelligence capacity.

What about the whole 24-days thing?  24 days!

Critics of the deal are saying that we will have to give the Iranians 24 days' notice before conducting any inspections.  This is simply untrue.

The IAEA, and the American and Western representatives who will help carry out its mandate, have constant monitoring of Iran's declared nuclear sites.  That includes 24/7 video monitoring, frequent inspections, and strict oversight of the whole nuclear fuel cycle.

If the US or its partners were to find a site they want inspected that is NOT on the list of declared Iranian nuclear sites, the process by which the IAEA, the concerned international party, and Iran negotiate and coordinate the inspection of that site may take no longer than 24 days.

Can't Iran just cover it up with that much warning?

If it is nearly impossible to get all of the nuclear equipment and infrastructure away from a site within 24 days, it is physically impossible to scrub the site clean of radiation and other evidence of nuclear activity in anywhere near that time frame.  If there is evidence of undeclared, unauthorized nuclear activity at a site, it will be found.

Most of all, if and when the IAEA, the US, or its partners discover that Iran is up to some funny business, we will be in a very strong position to investigate it and extract answers.  If we find that Iran is in violation of the nonproliferation deal, we will be in far, far stronger position to inflict intolerable punishment upon them for it than we would if the deal was not in place. Moreover, permitting Iran, Iranian businesses, and Iranian people to form relationships with Western business, social, and political entities will make it all the more painful for Iran to forsake those fresh ties if they decide to engage in military nuclear activity. As the flight of Western corporations and capital from Russia in the wake of the Ukraine crises have shown, Western firms are not very inclined to invest billions of dollars in countries against whom the US is engaged in geopolitical combat.

I posted about this the other night, but Iranians are dancing in the streets over this deal. They welcome it. They want it to work. They want their proud nation to re-gain its ties with other respectable countries. They want to be able to buy Western goods and watch Western shows and listen to Western music. I really feel like Iranians, especially young Iranians, feel like they have a stake in this deal working. This means something to the Grand Ayatollah, and it means something to their democratically-elected leader, Hassan Rouhani. Iran is hurting, and it doesn't want to hurt anymore.

Explainer 6: What's the worst that can happen if we reject the deal?

There's a lot of speculation on this question, but I'm going to stick the implications for American diplomacy and the conditions we would be imposing on the geopolitical game theory calculus and chess game.

If we reject this deal, we have rejected THE diplomatic option for ensuring that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon.  The only option left on the table is the military one.  If we do not accept this deal, it will mean that at the end of the day, our only avenue to reliably prevent Iranian nuclear weapons acquisition is to physically stop them from developing and constructing the bomb.  That would, realistically, mean destroying and rebuilding the Islamic Republic of Iran.  As some of you might remember, it did not go so well the last time we tried to do something like this.

Almost as important to note is that if we reject this deal, we have told the whole world that our pretenses for making them forego lucrative and geopolitically-advantageous business with Iran--to force Iran to agree to a highly-restrictive nuclear deal--were blatantly false.  We told the whole world that Iran needed to be isolated and shunned and punished because it was a threat to world security, but we showed that our real reason was that we just did not like them.  What's more, we broadcast to the world that when the US comes to the negotiating table, it's our way or the highway.  We don't make concessions.  We don't compromise.  We don't sacrifice.  In other words, using diplomacy as a way to resolve disputes with the United States is useless.

You know what that means?

It means that a lot more of our demands are going to either be empty threats (meaning we cannot get what we want or need) or commitments to war--to massive expenditures of treasure, to substantial diplomatic and geopolitical pain, and to the loss of life, limb, and spirit for thousands of American men and women under arms.  

Explainer 4 on the Iranian nuclear deal

Explainer 4: Why didn't they get a better deal?

Because opponents of this diplomacy in Israel and in the GOP have not really been forthcoming on specifics of what would constitute a "better deal," we are left to conjecture. From what I can surmise, they want a deal like this:

• Iran dismantles all nuclear infrastructure. No uranium enrichment. No plutonium reprocessing. Maybe even no nuclear energy.
• Iran concedes to American/Israeli interests on a range of other issues, including handing over four Americans held prisoner in Iran, the Iranian ballistic missile programme, and Iranian military/covert actions around the region. 
• I don't know, the Iranian government disappears and the Iranian people all of the sudden love America.

There is no basis for the United States to demand these things. Remember, Iran is guaranteed the right to peaceful nuclear energy under the NPT. Also, recall that the Iranian nuclear programme started about 50-odd years ago because THE US BUILT IT FOR THEM. There is also nothing in the NPT or in international law denying Iran the right to enrich its own nuclear fuel, and there are legitimate reasons why Iran would want to manufacture its own fuel supply.

The US has imposed the sanctions regime on Iran with the support of the international community by telling the international community that Iran was keen on violating international law (namely the NPT). If Iran is willing to accept a very, very highly scrutinising inspections regime to guarantee that they are not violating the NPT, and yet the US is still not satisfied, then our partners (and rivals) around the world have precious little reason to continue bearing costs to maintain the sanctions. They will simply no longer cooperate, and the sanctions regime that forced Iran to the table and which forced them to concede what they have will become a mere shell of itself, and it will lose pretty much all coercive force.

If Iran and the P5+1 were to come to a comprehensive agreement on the nuclear programme, but the US still refuses to accept Iran's nuclear concessions unless Iran also makes concessions on a whole range of other issues in which they are arguably not violating international law (certainly not international norms) and have no reason to concede on, not only will a deal be impossible, but maintaining the sanctions regime will also be impossible.  

From what I can tell from Israel's objections, they are hostile to the very idea of the US negotiating with an Iranian regime that is overtly and actively hostile to Israel. Those are certainly valid concerns, and the US has made strong commitments to Israeli security. But at the end of the day, Israel is not the only commitment or interest the US has in the region. The US and its Western partners cannot tolerate an indefinite geopolitical conflict with Iran, and they are not willing to invade Iran and institute an occupation regime.
If the past two years of Israeli foreign policy have offered any insight into how Israel negotiates with its enemies, we've learned that Israel simply doesn't do that. Israel wants its enemies destroyed. They had a golden opportunity to make real progress towards peace with Palestinians when Hamas and Fatah agreed to a unity government that would recognise Israel's right to exist. Israel rejected it out of hand because they don't want Hamas to exist. Instead, they let relations with Gaza deteriorate to the point of war, at which point they tried to resolve their issue with Hamas by playing whack-a-mole with bombs. They did not succeed.

Israel cannot destroy Iran. The US will not destroy Iran for Israel. Israel had best reconcile itself with the existence of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and maybe behave in such a fashion that Israel and Iran aren't at each others' throats.

But Joel! Iran doesn't even recognise Israel's right to exist! Iran thinks Israel is evil and should be wiped off the map!

1) The widely-circulated translation of Ahmedinejad's remarks is incorrect. He did not call for Israel to be destroyed. He said that the Zionist project of Israel should not exist. Not friendly, but also not "I will destroy you."

2) Pretty much every country in the Middle East outwardly speaks of Israel as an illegitimate state and an enemy, and yet they've gotten over themselves. Egypt got over it. Saudi Arabia got over it. Syria got over it. The Gulf states got over it. Turkey got over it. Hamas was willing to get over it before Israel went to war with them again. They all de facto treat Israel as a potentially rival but legitimate counterparty in regional geopolitics. If Israel stops launching covert ops against Iran and assassinating their scientists, Iran will get over it, too.

Explainer 3 on the Iranian nuclear deal

Explainer Question 3: Why is this happening now?

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani was elected in 2013 on a campaign that promised to rebuild a lagging Iranian economy and repair relations with the West. That meant negotiating an end to the sanctions imposed by the P5+1 (the 5 permanent members of the UN Security Council; the US, UK, France, PR China, and Russia, plus Germany). The Obama Administration considers this to have been a sign that the sanctions regime worked--because of the pain we inflicted upon Iran, they were forced to come to the negotiating table.

After about a year and a half of talks, and countless signals from Israeli, American, and Iranian politicians that this deal just wasn't gonna happen, the P5+1 and Iran have come to a concrete accord by which Iran will dismantle some elements of its nuclear programme and permit an unprecedentedly thorough and expansive regime of inspections in exchange for the gradual lifting of sanctions and un-freezing of Iranian assets in the West. This was achieved despite plenty of loud, disruptive, antagonistic shouting by government figures outside of the negotiations in Iran, Israel, and the US.

Factors that have likely contributed to the talks finally resolving include:
Israel repeatedly showing that it does not give a damn about how the US feels about its actions toward Iran or the Palestinian people, and that it is not serious at all about a meangingful, negotiated peace with its Palestinian neighbours. This likely freed the Obama Administration of some of its reservations about pissing off the Israelis because, after all, so what? Israel won't respect us anyway.
The case is similar with Saudi Arabia, I reckon. What's Saudi Arabia gonna do if we piss them off? Effectively turn ISIS into a giant of jihadist terror? Oh, wait, they already did!

The sanctions coalition is fracturing. When the big round of sanctions was imposed, the US and Russia were operating as distinct yet cooperating counter-parties in world affairs. Russia is now taking on the US and the West as an enemy, and is happy to not cooperate with American foreign policy objectives much at all. The case is similar with PR China, whose relations with the US are increasingly confrontational. Moreover, given the threats on European hydrocarbon (natural gas and petroleum) supplies from Russian aggression, Europe is probably really keen on doing business with the Iranians again, as well.

The US and the Western security order really need Iran's help taking on ISIS, and they need ours. ISIS and al-Qaeda are common enemies of the West and of Iran.

Explainer 2 on the Iranian nuclear deal

Explainer Question 2: How do we know Iran posed a nuclear threat, anyway?

This is a very good question. Iran has insisted for about a decade that its nuclear programme is entirely peaceful in nature. Indeed, the Supreme Leader of Iran, Grand Ayatollah Khameini, has explicitly declared nuclear weapons to be HARAM, or forbidden by Islam. Moreover, Iran is guaranteed the right to a non-military nuclear energy programme by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (the NPT, to which the US and Iran are both signatories). It's essential to note that public American intelligence estimates have repeatedly concluded that Iran has not decided to acquire a nuclear weapon.

That is all well and good, but it is clear from other evidence that Iran has been actively pursuing the LATENT nuclear capacity (the ability to quickly construct a field-worthy nuclear weapon should they make the call to acquire one).

How do we know this?

Iran has been caught conducting nuclear activities outside of the ones that they've declared to the International Atomic Energy Agency. They have been caught doing experiments on tightly-coordinated implosive detonations (one of the two means of causing a nuclear detonation). Iran has also been enriching uranium (a highly technologically intensive process which Iran does not have to do in order to produce nuclear energy, since they can buy reactor fissile material easily) to concentrations much higher than they need for nuclear energy (enriching to 20%, whereas nuclear reactors run on 4.3% enrichment, and there is no marginal benefit of taking it up to 20), and in much higher amounts than could plausibly be explained by peaceful uses (Iran claims that it is enriching to 20% for medical nuclear uses, but they sure don't need THAT much). Moreover, Iran's highly aggressive and active geopolitical posturing (through the development of its military, and particularly its deployment of covert forces and proxies, such as Hezbollah, Hamas [to a lesser extent], and the Quds force under General Qassem Suleimani) makes fears about their nuclear military ambitions very, very valid.

We have not been falsifying a confrontation with Iran. Iran is not an innocent, harmless state.

Explainer 1 on the Iranian nuclear deal

Hey everyone!

If you know me, then you know that there's little that I enjoy more in this world than looking smart on the internet. Thus, I'm gonna do a series of explainers on what the hell is up with this "Iran nuclear deal!" My information comes from a) my instruction in the 2010-2011 EPIIC class on nuclear issues, and b) my readings and learning since.  In particular, this article by Max Fisher of Vox informs a lot in my later explainers. If you disagree about a point or want to know what I'm basing it on, please feel free to comment.

1) What the heck is this all about?
The prospect of Iran possessing a nuclear weapon is one that rightly fills Washington, Tel Aviv, and most every other European and Middle Eastern capital with dread. The governments of these countries do not look kindly upon Iran. Whereas every Muslim Middle Eastern country other than Iran, Iraq, and Bahrain is majority Sunni (the dominant branch of Islam), those other countries are majority Shi'a. Iran is by far the most powerful, the most capable, and the most religiously and politically organised of the Shia majority countries. Because of this, along with a number of other factors, countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the rich Gulf states, and (to a lesser extent) Turkey look upon Iran as a geopolitical rival. Indeed, these countries have been essentially fighting against Iran by means of each side's proxies in Syria (the Gulf States, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey supporting the anti-Assad rebels, prominently including al-Qaeda and ISIS, whereas Iran is supporting the Assad government and its partners in Hezzbollah with both indirect and direct assistance).

Were Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon that they could field in combat, it would be profoundly destabilising in the Middle East, and thus the world. If Iran became a nuclear-armed country, it is almost certain that Saudi Arabia and the rich Gulf states would seek to acquire one as well. More big red nuclear buttons means more risk of those buttons being pressed. It would also put Israel in a position whereby it would actually be facing a plausible existential threat from abroad--a condition which has not existed since Syrian forces broke through Israeli lines the Yom Kippur War.

Right now, there exists a status quo in which Iran and the rest of the Middle East knows that if Tehran crosses a certain line (active aggression against American Gulf allies, a direct attack against Israel, or especially blocking the Straits of Hormuz, through which a large fraction of the world's petroleum is shipped), it would be met with a large US military response. Iran knows that it cannot win in a fight where the United States is hitting them with its massive cyber, naval, and aerospace superiority. The US is the best in the world at that kind of fighting, and there is nobody that can go into one of those fights against us thinking that they will win. This constrains Iran to a range of actions which, although destabilising and highly frustrating to American interests, are within a realm that the US can handle.

Were Iran to acquire plausible nuclear weapons capabilities, the US would be unable to smack Iran down without risking catastrophic Iranian retaliation. This is unacceptable.

The Obama Administration has made the denial of Iranian nuclear capability a key focal point of its foreign policy throughout its tenure. The Russia "reset" was instrumental to establishing the sanctions regime that forced Iran to the negotiating table. These negotiations have been a large priority in allocating US political and diplomatic capital. The Obama Administration made essentially no effort to support the Green Revolution in 2009 because a) it would have been entirely counter-productive, and b) because Iran has made it very, very clear that the highest priority of its diplomacy with the US is to maintain Iranian sovereignty and Iranian control of its own politics. Attempting to intervene would have poisoned the well of US-Iranian relations for decades to come.